【3月7日】【CEMA研讨会2019春季第一讲】 On Stable and Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-based Allocation Problems
发布日期：2019-03-01论文题目：On Stable and Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-based Allocation Problems
报告人：张永超（上海财经大学经济学院副教授）
论文摘要：For a given school choice (priority-based allocation) problem, we say that a set of students is a top fair set (TFS) if we can assign them their favorite schools without violating the priorities of other students, no matter which preferences other students have. We then provide an elimination process to find amaximal TFS, if any TFS exists. Our main theorem shows that for any priority structure, iterative removal of TFS is a well-defined algorithm if and only if the associated (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient, or equivalently, if and only if the priority structure is acyclic (Ergin, 2002). At priority structures that the TFS algorithm is well-defined, it is outcome equivalent to the deferred acceptance algorithm.
时间：3月7日（周四）中午12:10-13:30
地点：学院南路校区学术会堂712
报告人简介：张永超，上海财经大学经济学院副教授，新加坡国立大学数学博士，主要研究领域为数理经济学和博弈论。在International Journal of Game Theory，Theoretical Economics，Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Economic Theory, Economics Letters 等学术期刊上发表多篇论文。
主办：中国经济与管理研究院
[编辑]：孙颖
